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 Modernist Anti-Philosophicalism and
 Virginia Woolfs Critique of Philosophy1
 Michael Lackey
 Wellesley College
 On the topic of Virginia Woolf and philosophy, there have been many
 outstanding studies. Lucio Ruotolo uses Martin Heideggers exis-
 tential analysis of Dasein to illuminate Clarissa Dalloway s complex
 interaction with nothingness, "the void that borders meaning" (17); Mark
 Hussey uses the phenomenological theory of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to define
 the "ambiguous self" in its relation to a numinous "reality" in Woolfs novels;
 Pamela Caughie develops "a conceptual model," which is based on Ludwig
 Wittgensteins philosophy of language, "for narrative discourse [...] in terms
 ofthe multiple and shifting relations among signifying systems" (81) in order
 to analyze and interpret Woolfs corpus; and Ann Banfield uses Bertrand
 RusselTs "symbolic logic" to shed light "on Woolfs thinking about language"
 (42-43). That the authors of these studies have intelligently and convincingly
 illuminated Woolf s work through these philosophers' systems is certain, but
 one can only wonder if Woolf, given her view of philosophy, would have been
 so eager to have her works analyzed from a philosophical perspective. After all,
 philosophy was a discipline in crisis during Woolfs day, and a casual glance at
 philosophy and the philosopher in Woolf s works indicates not just that she was
 aware of the unparalleled assault on philosophy s most treasured axioms and
 methods, but that she was also trying to deliver the deathblow to philosophy
 itself. Given Woolfs blatant critique of philosophy, I argue that using philoso?
 phy to analyze and interpret her corpus places the critic at odds with Woolf s
 political and aesthetic agenda. There are three stages to my argument. In the
 first, I provide a brief history ofthe early-twentieth century crisis in philosophy.
 In the second, I examine Woolfs treatment of philosophy and the philosopher
 in light ofthis crisis. In the third, I draw a conclusion about Woolf's response
 to and ultimate rejection of philosophy.
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 I.
 "The appartement ofthe Boulevard des Philosophes presented the dreary
 signs of impending abandonment. It looked desolate and as if already
 empty to my eyes."
 -(joseph conrad,
 Under WesternEyes 275)
 In the Western intellectual tradition, philosophy has been defined as a
 discipline that makes use of rigorous forms of logic in order to apprehend
 an overarching ahistorical truth, which is embodied in either an Ideal Form
 or a universal concept. Given the superior nature of philosophy's intellectual
 tools and primary object of desire, it has been dubbed a "nonempirical super
 science" (Rorty, Contingency 4), a disciplinary touchstone used to determine
 the quality and value of all other systems of knowledge.2 On this view, a dis?
 cipline has legitimacy and worth insofar as it contributes to, approximates, or
 yields philosophical knowledge. Philosophy certainly dominated the Western
 intellectual tradition from Plato to the end ofthe nineteenth century, but by
 1899, Bertrand Russell was suggesting that philosophy was on the verge of
 losing its title as the Monarch of knowledge and truth: "Philosophy, by the
 slow victories of its own offspring, has been forced to forgo, one by one, its
 high pretensions" (95).
 What, in part, accounted for philosophy's demotion on the socio-
 intellectual chain of being was the legitimation of psychology as an indepen-
 dent discipline. Toward the end ofthe nineteenth century, "psychology," which
 "was much more closely affiliated with philosophy than it is today," "began to
 emancipate itself as a discipline" (Ryan 2). Such a split had enormous ramifica-
 tions, for while philosophy conceived ofthe human primarily in terms ofthe
 mind, an ahistorical and universal thinking faculty that uses logic to ascertain
 immutable, non-relative Truth, psychology conceived of the human primarily
 in terms of the psyche, a culturally-specific thinking faculty that knows only
 in relation to its cultural context. Martin Jay intelligently articulates the threat
 that the emancipation of psychology posed to philosophy: "Reducing the mind
 to the psyche was problematic for logic and mathematics because it opened the
 door to relativism in which truth was merely a function ofthe specific thinking
 mind in which it appeared or of its cumulative experience over time" (95). In
 short, psychology s emancipation forced modernists to choose between philos?
 ophy s metaphysical mind, which has the capacity to apprehend non-normative
 and non-relative Truth, or psychology s culturally embedded psyche, which has
 the capacity to know only in relation to its cultures provisional truths. Russell
 noted this shift from philosophy to psychology when he was still a member of
 that intensely philosophical organization known as the Cambridge Apostles.
 As S. P. Rosenbaum notes, Russell witnessed in the early twentieth century how
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 "philosophy and politics [were] being replaced" among the Apostles "by intro-
 spective analyses of shades of feeling" (174). So for someone heavily influenced
 by the Apostles, like Virginia Woolf, who had to choose between philosophy s
 metaphysical mind and its absolute Truth or psychology s culturally-embedded
 psyche and its historically-constructed "truth," she claims that modernists
 chose psychology: "For the moderns 'that', the point of interest, lies very likely
 in the dark places of psychology" ("Modern" 152).3
 Deeply concerned about the radical subversion of philosophy was T.E.
 Hulme, the modernist aesthetician who understood the threat that the anthro-
 pomorphic turn in knowledge posed to Truth. For Hulme, should the intel?
 lectual world accept the view that truth is a human construction instead of a
 pre-given Idea, all conceptual systems would be nothing more than a Weltan-
 schauung. To save universal Truth and objective Reality, therefore, modernist
 intellectuals have only one option: to purge philosophy of "anthropomorphism"
 so that they could re-establish an "objective basis" for knowledge, a basis that
 does "not in the least depend on the human mind." Once philosophy has purged
 itself of the anthropomorphic or empirical prejudice, "it becomes possible to
 think of certain 'higher'concepts, those ofthe good, of love, etc, as, at the same
 time, simple, and not necessarily to be analysed into more elementary (generally
 sensual) elements" (45). For Hulme, when Truth is tainted by the sensual or
 the anthropomorphic, it is corrupt and thereby loses its metaphysical character.
 In other words, "truth" that is anthropomorphic or sensual is not Truth.
 At the same time that Hulme (late teens and early 1920's) was trying to
 rehabilitate and reground philosophy so that the intellectual community could
 recover epistemological certainty and epistemic authority, Ludwig Wittgen-
 stein was furthering the project of undermining philosophy in his ground-
 breaking book Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). Since the "sense of the
 world must lie outside the world" (183 [6.41]) philosophy has no choice but to
 recognize its limits, which is to say that philosophy, according to Wittgenstein,
 could no longer lay epistemological claim to aesthetic, ethical, or metaphysical
 knowledge. Given this situation, Wittgenstein endorsed a philosophical silence,
 a silence that he would maintain for nearly ten years (1919-1928).4 But even
 after Wittgenstein re-entered the intellectual scene, he did not change his posi?
 tion about philosophy: "The nimbus of philosophy has been lost" (Wittgensteins
 Lectures 21). While Wittgenstein may have broken his post-Tractatus silence,
 he never gave philosophy back the ladder it had once used to ascend into the
 metaphysical heaven of Ideas.
 This inability to apprehend a metaphysical Truth certainly posed a major
 challenge to philosophy, but it was the suggestion that philosophers are?of
 necessity? epistemologically defective that ultimately led so many modernists
 to reject the discipline. Primarily governed by reason, philosophy only acknowl-
 edges the existence of that which is conscious or rational, and as a consequence,
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 it renders that which is non-conscious or non-rational ontologically negligible.
 To put this in the words of Sigmund Freud, "To most people who have been
 educated in philosophy the idea of anything psychical which is not also con-
 scious is so inconceivable that it seems to them absurd and refutable simply by
 logic" {Ego 3). Philosophy treats that which is conscious and rational as having
 legitimate existence, while that which is non-rational does not exist in the strict
 sense ofthe word.5 In terms of Freudian psychology, the non-rational contents
 of the unconscious have no true existence for philosophers and are therefore
 not worth considering.6
 D.H. Lawrence makes a similar case against philosophy in his post-
 humously published essay "Why the Novel Matters." For Lawrence, those
 "damned philosophers" have misled everyone by asserting their intellectual
 superiority. Indeed, the philosopher, "because he can think, decides that noth?
 ing but thoughts matter"(535). Philosophers give thoughts ontological priority
 because they are immutable and universal. According to this logic, that which
 is mutable and contingent is not just ontologically inferior, it does not exist
 in a strict sense. Aldous Huxley develops this idea in some detail through the
 character of Mark Rampion, who is based on Lawrence, in his novel Point
 Counter Point. Rampion makes a distinction between "human truth," which is
 a human-constructed concept that assumes a provisional form in and through
 a semiotic sign, and "non-human truth," which is the philosophers mind-
 independent Concept, subject neither to decay nor change (398). For Rampion,
 "the non-human truth isnt merely irrelevant; it's dangerous" (399). This is the
 case because those in pursuit ofthe "non-human truth" invariably distinguish
 the relative matters of the ephemeral world (what Rampion refers to as "see-
 ondary qualities") from the absolute matters (primary qualities) ofthe objective
 world. Put in more concrete terms, the spiritual soul is superior to the human
 body, just as the immaterial mind is superior to the contingent psyche. For
 Rampion, this distinction can only have disastrous consequences for individual
 beings: "it's an established non-human truth?or at least it was established
 in my young days?that secondary qualities have no real existence" (399). By
 adopting this view, many philosophers have sought eternal Truth and have
 totally blinded themselves to the contingent, psyche-bound "self." After all, the
 psychic "self," as a secondary quality, has no real existence. But since "secondary
 qualities" are "the only real ones," philosophers in pursuit ofa phantom absolute
 do irreparable damage to themselves because their search for a non-human
 truth is not only futile (since no such truth exists) but dangerous (since the
 absolute makes secondary qualities seem negligible and irrelevant).
 Perhaps the most comical and vicious representation of philosophy can
 be found in Huxley s "First Philosopher s Song," a poem from the 1920 vol?
 ume Leda. Aware of his physical inferiority to the ape, the narrator notes that
 humans can only assert their superiority with their "mind." Given this logic,
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 the more humans valorize the mind, the more they can justify their dominance
 over the animal kingdom. Therefore, using the "Mind fabulous, mind sublime
 and free," the philosopher, who is "Greedy of luscious truth," wends his way
 "through the mangrove maze / Of metaphysics," and thereby intellectually
 "Outruns the hare, outhops the goat."But since mind, instead of being a non-
 contingent, immaterial faculty of a spiritual soul, is actually just "a nimbler
 beast," Huxley implicitly exposes the philosopher's metaphysical faculty as a
 Darwinian creation, a human-constructed tool to ensure the survival ofthe fit-
 test. In other words, metaphysical truth and the immaterial mind are, not onto-
 logical facts of being, but instrumental fictions that humans have constructed to
 secure power and dominion over brute beasts.To conclude the poem, therefore,
 Huxley s narrator puts the philosopher in his rightful place:
 But oh, the sound of simian mirth!
 Mind, issued from the monkey s womb,
 Is still umbilical to earth,
 Earth its home and earth its tomb.
 The joke is ultimately on the philosopher, for whatever pretence he has once
 had to superiority over the animal kingdom, whatever belief he has held of
 the ascending ladder of Knowledge into a metaphysical Heaven of Ideas, the
 secular truth has now been revealed through the smirk of a mindful monkey.
 This all-too-brief description of modernist anti-philosophicalism should
 provide an adequate backdrop for understanding Woolf s uncharitable depiction
 of philosophy and philosophers.
 "just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the proudest of
 men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes ofthe
 universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought."
 ?(Friedrich Nietzsche,
 "On Truth and Lies in a
 Nonmoral Sense" 79)
 In the 1928 novel Orlando: A Biography, Woolfs narrator refers to "phi?
 losophy" or "the philosophers" seven times.7 These references are neither ran?
 dom nor haphazard. Indeed, they strategically chart the decline and ultimate
 demise of philosophy. The first two references occur during the reign of King
 James I in the seventeenth century, when philosophy still stood guard before
 the door ofthe Truth. Given philosophy s superior standing within the culture,
 the philosophers'words carry considerable epistemic authority, which Woolfs
 narrator underscores by turning to the philosophers to legitimate a particular
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 viewpoint. For instance, when Orlandos mood swings from euphoria to
 despair, the narrator interjects: "the philosopher is right who says that noth?
 ing thicker than a knife's blade separates happiness from melancholy" (45).
 In a scene only sixteen pages later, philosophers are invoked again. When the
 Thames, which "had been solid ice of such thickness that it seemed permanent
 as stone" (61-62), undergoes an almost instantaneous thaw, it was dubbed "a
 sulphur spring," a reference that gains legitimacy because it is one "to which
 many philosophers inclined"(62).The philosophers are called upon again later
 in the novel to explain Orlandos transformation from man to woman. After
 the metamorphosis, Orlando becomes "more modest" and "more vain" (187).
 The reason, "some philosophers will say" (187), is the "change of clothes." It
 is at this point, however, that the philosophers' perspective is dismissed, for as
 the narrator interjects: "This is the view of some philosophers and wise ones,
 but on the whole, we incline to another" (188). From this point on, philoso?
 phy is mentioned only twice, but the philosophers are never invoked again to
 legitimize a particular idea or way of thinking. In fact, within the historical
 context of Orlando, philosophy dies in the nineteenth century, for once the
 novel enters the twentieth century, there are no more references to philosophy
 or the philosophers.
 This is the case because ofthe shift in the intellectual community s view of
 knowledge. Richard Rorty can help shed some light on this shift. In his recent
 essay, "Analytic and Conversational Philosophy," Rorty defines traditional and
 analytic philosophy s orientation toward knowledge in terms of "an overarch-
 ing ahistorical framework of human existence that philosophers should try to
 describe with greater and greater accuracy" (27). Implicit in this view is the
 belief that there exists a mind-independent Concept that is what it is whether
 humans perceive it or not. Moreover, this Concept is best suited to represent
 the world's essence or nature. Therefore, the task ofthe philosopher is "to pin
 down" this invariable and universally valid Concept (21) so that he or she can
 represent Reality. Starting with Hegel, however, concepts were treated "like
 persons?never quite the same twice, always developing, always maturing"
 (21). This is, according to Rorty, the conversational philosophers view ofthe
 "concept." Instead of being an immutable, mind-independent reality, it is a
 human-constructed semiotic force that evolves in relation to specific com-
 munities of language users. The idea of getting a concept right, therefore, is
 simply incoherent.
 While Rorty uses this distinction between the immutable and evolving
 concept as a way of distinguishing analytic from conversational (his term
 for non-analytic) philosophy, Woolf makes the same distinction in order to
 distinguish the age of philosophy from the post-philosophical age. Let us see
 how this works in Orlando. Immediately after the narrator's second reference
 to philosophy, in which the philosopher "says that nothing thicker than a
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 knife's blade separates happiness from melancholy" (45), the narrator makes
 an observation about the way the mind functions at this point in history: "For
 that was the way his mind worked now, in violent see-saws from life to death
 stopping at nothing in between" (46). In the world of binary oppositions, there
 is either male or female, life or death, right or wrong, and if humans would
 understand the world aright, they must adopt a conceptual system that would
 clearly identify and define what each polar conceptual opposite is in and of
 itself. But after the demise of philosophy, the mind functions much differently,
 which leads to a new view of the concept: "everything was partly something
 else, and each gained an odd moving power from this union of itself and some?
 thing not itself so that with this mixture of truth and falsehood her [Orlando's]
 mind became like a forest in which things moved; lights and shadows changed,
 and one thing became another" (323). By this point in the novel, which is the
 year 1928, there are no more references to philosophy or the philosophers
 (the last reference occurs in the late-nineteenth century [259]), which is only
 appropriate since the whole traditional paradigm of philosophy has crumbled,
 according to Woolfs narrator, with the discovery that the concept shifts and
 evolves such that one thing could even become another. This view is clearly
 anathema to the traditional lovers of Wisdom, because it implicitly rejects the
 idea of an immutable, mind-independent concept that is what it is whether
 humans apprehend it or not.
 There are certainly many reasons why Woolf's narrator delivers the death-
 blow to philosophy and the philosophers in Orlando, but to understand those
 reasons, I want to turn now to To The Lighthouse. To The Lighthouse showcases
 two separate approaches to knowledge: Mr. Ramsay and Charles Tansley's
 philosophical approach, which is defined in terms of "'[s]ubject and object
 and the nature of reality'" (23), and Mrs. Ramsay and Lily's approach, which
 is briefly defined in terms of "intimacy itself," an experience that is considered
 "not knowledge but unity" at one moment, but then considered "knowledge"
 the next moment (51). In this novel, while Woolf makes it clear that philo?
 sophical knowledge is invalid, it is actually the devastating interpersonal and
 psychological consequences of adopting a philosophical approach to knowledge
 that interests her most. I take it that Woolf would not object to philosophical
 knowledge, even though she considers it false and obsolete, if it were not so
 destructive. But as it turns out, philosophy makes human connection and inti?
 macy, a basic sensitivity to the needs and desires of human beings, impossible,
 which is why Woolf wishes to banish philosophy and the philosopher.
 Woolf spends considerable time underscoring Mr. Ramsay s occupation. A
 professional philosopher, Mr. Ramsay certainly does not earn enough money to
 be a wealthy man. As the narrator wryly interjects: "To feed eight children on
 philosophy!" (22). While Mr. Ramsay may not be affluent, he has earned some
 respect in his profession, which is apparent from his disciple, Charles Tansley,
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 who refers to Ramsay as the "greatest metaphysician ofthe time" (37). Specifi?
 cally, Tansley is enticed by a Bertrand Russell approach to philosophy, which
 is described as "some branch of mathematics or philosophy" (7).
 Highlighting Mr. Ramsay's philosophical orientation towards life is impor?
 tant, because it explains his serious epistemological limitations. Mr. Ramsay's
 flaws in perception are certainly obvious to everyone around him, especially his
 wife, for as Mrs. Ramsay claims:
 His understanding often astonished her. But did he notice the flowers? No. Did
 he notice the view? No. Did he even notice his own daughter s beauty, or whether
 there was pudding on his plate or roast beef? He would sit at table with them like
 a person in a dream. (70)
 It is "his narrowness, his blindness" (46) that so irritates Mrs. Ramsay. What
 explains Mr. Ramsay's inability to see the mundane objects of everyday living
 is his philosophical focus on metaphysics. Following Plato, Mr. Ramsay treats
 quotidian objects as pale reflections of an Ideal Form. For instance, while hav?
 ing a discussion with his wife, Mr. Ramsay fails to take note of the physical
 world: "He did not look at the flowers, which his wife was considering, but at
 a spot about a foot or so above them" (66). For Woolfs philosopher, the mate?
 rial object is a mere imitation of an immaterial essence, so instead of focusing
 his attention on the paltry item in front of him, which has no real existence
 for him because it is composed of secondary qualities, he concentrates on the
 metaphysical reality that stands a little more than twelve inches above the
 object, that immutable, mind-independent Concept (an Ideal Form of sorts)
 which is more real and more true than the ephemeral object.
 In addition to distinguishing reality and appearance, Mr. Ramsay sub-
 scribes to a teleological worldview. Each generation of philosophers adds to the
 finite fund of knowledge, and when a truly gifted philosopher comes upon the
 scene, he could contribute to the linear alphabet of logic and truth (like "the
 alphabet from A to Z" [35]). In this world, the ultimate epistemic destination
 is philosophical in nature, the absolute philosophical Truth toward which all
 knowledge tends.
 Indeed, as a philosopher, Mr. Ramsay has adopted a metaphysician's per?
 spective ofthe world, which is to say that he sees the world through the per-
 ceptual lens of "angular essences." So if Mr. Ramsay were to experience "lovely
 evenings, with all their flamingo clouds and blue and silver," he would reduce
 it all "to a white deal four-legged table" (23). In short, the philosophers ability
 to make razor-sharp distinctions has made him capable of demarcating the
 exact form of objects in the world (assuming, of course, that such an exact
 form exists) but incapable of seeing or experiencing the wave-like fluidity of
 an undemarcatable world. To highlight this epistemological flaw, Mr. Ramsay
 is pictured in terms of an "arid scimitar," an ancient Asian sword that, like
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 metaphysics, belongs in a museum instead of contemporary society. With this
 epistemological weapon he smites "through the leaves and flowers even of
 that happy world [the world that James shares with his mother] and making it
 shrivel and fall" (186). Mr. Ramsay may have a gift for making clear categorical
 distinctions, but his philosophical gift destroys the world.
 There are a few important assumptions at the base of Mr. Ramsay's philo?
 sophical orientation toward knowledge: a metaphysical Truth, which is more
 real and more valid than the physical object, exists; philosophers, more than
 anyone else, are epistemologically superior and therefore best stationed to
 apprehend that Truth; true knowledge involves an accumulation of established
 metaphysical facts that tend toward an ultimate end; and philosophical truth
 entails razor-sharp categorical distinctions. But if these assumptions turn out
 to be false, then the philosopher s system of knowledge would be a rhetorical
 and psychological imposition on rather than a neutral and objective account
 ofthe world.
 Ironically, Mrs. Ramsay and Lily Briscoe, who implicitly reject Mr. Ramsay
 and Charles Tansley's philosophical assumptions, have a much more sophis-
 ticated understanding of knowledge than the two philosophers. Unlike Mr.
 Ramsay, who sees knowledge in terms of a teleological progression culminat-
 ing with a final metaphysical Truth, Lily does not see knowledge as building
 toward a final philosophical pronouncement. Instead, she thinks of knowledge
 in non-teleological terms: "little daily miracles, illuminations, matches struck
 unexpectedly in the dark" (161). Indeed, the narrator shares Lily's view of
 knowledge, for when Mr. Ramsay resolves himself to the fact that he will never
 complete the alphabet of Truth, the narrator directly contradicts the aging
 philosopher with the parenthetical remark: as "if thought ran like an alphabet
 from AtoZ" (120).
 Given this rejection of a cumulative system of immutable Truths, Mrs.
 Ramsay and Lily focus on the contingent knowledge of the human inner life.
 Specifically, what interests both women is knowledge of the unconscious, the
 very knowledge that philosophy rejects as non-rational and therefore non-
 existent, according to Freud and Rampion. Woolf examines this idea through
 Mrs. Ramsay s experience with the subconscious colonizing impulse of reli?
 gious discourse, an idea that she first examined in her 1925 short story "A
 Simple Melody," which was a trial run for Mrs. Ramsay's experience with
 the semiotic unconscious of religious discourse.8 In this story, Woolf creates
 George Carslake, a character who mocks believers: "To believe in God indeed!
 When every rational power protested against the crazy and craven idiocy of
 such a saying!"(203). Ironically, Carslake discovers that, despite his overt athe-
 ism, "he had been trapped into the words. 'To believe in God.'" As an atheist,
 Carslake specifically resents how he is trapped into belief through language.
 Whatever phrase he uses, however mundane, tinkles "in his ear with a sham
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 religious flavour," for the religious, according to Carslake, colonize discourse,
 appropriating and then fashioning it to serve their ends: '"Getting home'," for
 example, "the religious had appropriated that. It meant going to Heaven."The
 word "appropriated" suggests a verbal entrapment, a linguistic imperialism that
 coerces language users into adopting the theist's discourse whether they are
 aware of it or not, whether they desire to do so or not.
 Like Carslake, Mrs. Ramsay experiences the colonizing impulse of reli?
 gious discourse. In a weak moment, she says: "We are in the hands of the
 Lord." But immediately questioning the validity of such a claim, she observes,
 like Carslake, that she has been "trapped" into belief: "Who had said it? Not
 she; she had been trapped into saying something she did not mean" (63). On
 discovering the nature of her situation, Mrs. Ramsay searches "into her mind
 and her heart, purifying out of existence that lie, any lie" (63). The subtle but
 coercive discourse of belief entraps Mrs. Ramsay, so to liberate herself, she
 must probe her inner life and scrutinize the degree to which she has been
 subjected into being as a religious person. Once she identifies how the theist's
 "lie" has taken possession of her at the level ofthe unconscious, she can then
 begin the process of "purifying" herself. In short, Mrs. Ramsay is not concerned
 with metaphysical knowledge ofthe external world, the philosophical dictates
 of reason; she is interested in something much more basic and fundamental,
 knowledge of the semiotic unconscious, the very knowledge that predeter-
 mines conscious and rational knowledge systems. This is Freud's unconscious
 "mental processes," which make the rational ego no longer a amaster in its own
 home'' (Standard 285), or Marx's claim that "social being" (389) determines
 consciousness rather than human consciousness determining a person's being.
 To my mind, however, Nietzsche is clearest and most insightful in depicting
 the semiotic unconscious. In the Epilogue to The Case of Wagner, he claims:
 "But all of us have, unconsciously, involuntarily in our bodies values, words,
 formulas, moralities of opposite descent?we are, physiologically considered,
 false" (192). For Nietzsche, the beginning of "knowledge" is to recognize our
 physiologically false condition. Since we have been claimed at the level ofthe
 unconscious by our culture s "values, words, formulas, [and] moralities," we
 can never be physiologically true.9 But we can be less false if we understand
 that we have been possessed at the level of the unconscious. Only when we
 acknowledge that our conscious and rational systems of knowledge have been,
 in large measure, predetermined by the unconscious knowledge that inhabits
 our bodies can we begin to have a clearer understanding of ourselves. In other
 words, to have knowledge, one must begin with the tenuous knowledge ofthe
 semiotic unconscious. Conversely, to lack such knowledge is to have skewed
 knowledge, knowledge that is not only distorted but destructive.
 Significantly, Woolf clearly indicates that Mr. Ramsay lacks knowledge
 of the semiotic unconscious. For instance, just after Mrs. Ramsay identifies
This content downloaded from 146.57.3.25 on Fri, 06 Mar 2020 21:07:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 86 Journal of Modern Literature
 the semiotic unconscious of religious discourse and subsequently exorcises
 that discourse from her unconscious, Mr. Ramsay enters the scene laughing to
 himself as he reflects on the older David Hume, who had "grown enormously
 fat" and was "stuck in a bog" (64). This interjection would seem misplaced were
 the reader unaware of Mr. Ramsay s thoughts about the eighteenth-century
 skeptic,but consistent with the theme of being trapped into belief, Woolfs nar?
 rator informs the reader nine pages later what specifically causes Mr. Ramsay
 to laugh: an old woman rescued Hume from the bog "on condition he said the
 Lord's prayer" (73). Both Mrs. and Mr. Ramsay are confronted with situations
 in which a person is "trapped" into belief, but while Mrs. Ramsay uses the occa-
 sion to interrogate the way such knowledge has taken possession of her from
 within and then to purge herself of this discourse, Mr. Ramsay dismisses the
 experience with a laugh. The implication, of course, is that Mr. Ramsay will, at
 an unconscious level, remain in thrall to the semiotic unconscious of religious
 discourse, while Mrs. Ramsay has, at an unconscious level, liberated herself.10
 This distinction between philosophy's metaphysical Truths and Woolfs
 semiotic unconscious has radical consequences on human knowledge and
 knowledge of humans. Through reason and logic, philosophy produces meta?
 physical Knowledge, an immutable system of Truth that has the qualities of
 being permanent, universal, and/or objective. But if, as Nietzsche and Woolf
 suggest, the unstable and variable contents of the unconscious significantly
 influence the way humans frame their experiences, then philosophy's rational
 and conscious dictates would be profoundly unreliable. But more than that, if
 the contingent "values, words, formulas, [and] moralities" of the unconscious
 are the most fundamental part of our uniquely human being, our being as
 humans, then to know fellow humans we must, first and foremost, understand
 the mutable and ephemeral contents of the humans semiotic unconscious.
 Let me briefly indicate how these two approaches to knowledge afifect the way
 people interact with one another.
 It is knowledge ofthe unconscious that makes Mrs. Ramsay and Lily able
 to understand others and thereby make life more meaningful for those around
 them. What is most important to Mrs. Ramsay and Lily is the "art" of under?
 standing the inner life ("secret chambers" [51]) of others. As Lily tries to use
 this "art" to enter the inner life of Mrs. Ramsay, she says that this experience is
 "not knowledge but unity," but then, in the same sentence, she concludes that
 it is "intimacy itself, which is knowledge" (51). Knowledge ofthe unconscious
 is always tenuous because it relates to "secondary qualities," the contingent
 "realities" ofan individuals psychic life. So when anyone speaks of an intimate
 knowledge of a person s inner world, there is always the suggestion that this
 is a provisional form of knowledge. Lily caprures the essence ofthis unstable
 knowledge when she reflects, much later in the novel, on her intimate experi?
 ence with Mrs. Ramsay: "Who knows what we are, what we feel? Who knows
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 even at the moment of intimacy,This is knowledge?" (171). Intimate knowledge
 is suggestive, contingent, provisional, so while a knower, like Lily, may have
 "X-ray" (91) vision of a persons inner life, that knowledge is ephemeral and
 temporary at best?punctuated with a question mark.
 For philosophers, however, who treat "secondary qualities" as non-rational
 and therefore non-existent, they cannot even see secondary qualities, like
 the "secret chambers" of a persons inner life. It is such a narrow and narcis-
 sistic mindset that compels the Ramsay children to criticize Tansley: "It was
 him?his point of view" (8) that accounts for his egotistical way of interacting
 with others, the children claim. For Woolf, there are three separate reasons
 why philosophers are epistemologically defective and therefore dysfunctional
 in their relationship with others.The first relates to the philosophers inability
 to respect the inner life of another. We see this most readily during the dinner
 scene, when Tansley criticizes the "silly women" for talking all their "damned
 rot" (85). Behind Tansley's criticism is the philosophers primary/secondary
 distinction. As in Huxley s Point Counter Point, there are realities, like pri?
 mary qualities, that are more real than mere trifles, like secondary qualities.
 To highlight this primary/secondary distinction, Woolf has Tansley contrast
 his philosophical studies and female chit-chat: "He had been reading in his
 room, and now he came down and it all seemed to him silly, superficial, flimsy"
 (85). Compared to the deep philosophical realities that he studies, trifling
 conversation is mere gibberish, so Tansley thinks that it is not worth noting.
 It is this philosophical mindset that explains Mr. Ramsay's inability to see the
 people who stand in front of him: "He glared at them [William Bankes and
 Lily Briscoe] without seeming to see them" (18). Only the deepest realities
 that philosophy can access have value, so if individuals are not in contact with
 or do not shed light on those particular realities, they are negligible, virtually
 non-existent.
 This inability to see or appreciate secondary qualities leads to a profound
 insensitivity, which is the second reason why Woolf faults philosophy. For
 instance, Mr. Ramsay has the tendency to dismiss the inner life of others as
 insignificant. Little James Ramsay desires to go sailing to a lighthouse on the
 morrow, but the philosophical Mr. Ramsay, who attends to factual knowledge
 instead of individual psychologies, dashes all his sons hope by telling him that
 the weather will probably not be suitable for such a journey. Mrs. Ramsay, who
 is more concerned with James's psychological well-being than the weather
 outlook, cannot understand her husband s blatant disregard for James s feelings.
 After Mr. Ramsay reiterates his insensitive comments about the imminent bad
 weather, Mrs. Ramsay observes: "To pursue truth with such astonishing lack of
 consideration for other people's feelings, to rend the thin veils of civilization so
 wantonly, so brutally, was to her so horrible an outrage of human decency that,
 without replying, she bent her head as if to let the pelt ofjagged hail, the drench
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 ofdirty water, besparter her unrebuked" (32). Does Mr. Ramsay's philosophical
 pursuit of Truth make him insensitive to his sons personal desires? Or, does
 his philosophical orientation make him blind to his child s boyhood dream? I
 suggest that for Woolf philosophical Truth makes individuals epistemologically
 defective, which leads to an emotional insensitivity. In terms of Mr. Ramsay s
 philosophical orientation, because the contingent psyche, in relation to the
 universal and absolute, has no real existence, he cannot see his sons personal
 needs and desires and the boy's subsequent trauma and crisis.
 The final reason, which is logically connected with the first two, why Woolf
 objects to philosophy relates to the philosophers tyrannical impulse to coerce
 and impose on others. Both Tansley and Mr. Ramsay are frequently described
 in terms of their "exactingness and egotism" (36); "the egotistical man" (38);
 "he is tyrannical" (46); "He is intolerably egotistical. Worst of all, he is a tyrant"
 (190). But to say that Tansley and Mr. Ramsay are egotistical and tyrannical is
 certainly not that shocking, for even the most casual reader ofthe novel could
 hardly miss this point. What has yet to be clarified in Woolf studies, however,
 is precisely how Woolf links philosophy and this coercive, imposing, egotisti?
 cal, and tyrannical mindset.The explanation can be found in the philosophers
 claim to metaphysical knowledge?the knowledge that leads to an "ugly
 imperialism" (536), according to Lawrence.11 While the standard person only
 perceives the secondary qualities of an object or the world, the philosopher sees
 a stable ontological structure behind the contingent and deceptive world of
 appearances, and that ontological structure is supposedly more real and more
 legitimate than the secondary-quality observations of non-philosophers. But if
 the "values, words, formulas, [and] moralities" ofthe semiotic unconscious pre-
 determine the philosophers rational conceptual frame, then secondary qualities
 would be the only reality and the philosophers metaphysical Truth would be a
 fictional creation, something that Huxley's smirking monkey implicitly com-
 municates in the closing lines ofthe "First Philosophers Song.'Tn other words,
 if the non-empirical metaphysical world is nothing more than an imaginary
 construction, then the philosophers primary/secondary (reality/appearance)
 distinction would be null and void.12
 We see the precise character ofthe philosophers mindset through Tansley's
 and Ramsay s interactions with others, which William Bankes articulates in
 his observations about Tansley: "for Mr. Tansley seemed to be saying, You have
 wasted your lives. You are all of you wrong. Poor old fogies, you're hopelessly
 behind the times" (94). Like Mr. Ramsay, Tansley conceives of knowledge in
 teleological terms, and since Bankes and company have failed to keep pace with
 developments in philosophy, their views ofthe world are insignificant and even
 wrong?they are still trapped in O or P. On this view, it is the philosophers
 superior epistemology, which leads to superior knowledge, that justifies the phi-
 losopher's egregious acts of imposition on others. After all, if the uninformed
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 masses lack the philosopher's refined perceptual faculty, their judgments can be
 neither trusted nor respected. This explains why Mr. Ramsay feels justified in
 compelling James and Cam to go to the lighthouse late in the novel:
 He had made them come. He had forced them to come. In their anger they hoped
 that the breeze would never rise, that he might be thwarted in every possible way,
 since he had forced them to come against their wills. (162-63)
 Given Mr. Ramsay's superior understanding of humans and the world, it only
 stands to reason that he would know what is best for James and Cam and would
 therefore be best stationed to make decisions on their behalf.
 But if the philosopher's metaphysical reality turns out to be an epistemic
 construction of the will rather than an objective discovery of the intellect, then
 the philosopher would be guilty of asserting and imposing a rhetorical will
 to power on others instead of providing a neutral and objective system of
 knowledge. And since the narrator of To The Lighthouse identifies philosophi?
 cal knowledge as false, we can assume that Tansley and Mr. Ramsay's claims
 to superior knowledge are really efforts to conceal their self-serving acts of
 power over others. Mrs. Ramsay specifically notes this ruthless will to power
 in Tansley. After Bankes praises the Waverly novels, Tansley "denounced" them
 "when he knew nothing about it, nothing about it whatsoever." What Tansley
 says discloses nothing about the Waverly novels, but it does reveal much about
 him, for as Mrs. Ramsay says to herself: "He wanted to assert himself, and so
 it would always be with him till he got his Professorship or married his wife,
 and so need not be always saying, l-I-I'" (106). But getting a Professorship
 certainly did not eliminate this tendency in Mr. Ramsay, for the elderly phi?
 losopher imposes on Lily just as Tansley imposes on Bankes and Mrs. Ramsay:
 "Let him [Mr. Ramsay] be fifty feet away, let him not even speak to you, let
 him not even see you, he permeated, he prevailed, he imposed himself" (149).
 Both Tansley and Mr. Ramsay assume that they perceive a deeper reality than
 those around them, and as a consequence, they feel justified in imposing their
 view on others. But since their metaphysical Truth is just a construction ofthe
 will, which the text underscores by focusing on the philosopher's tyrannical
 tendency to impose, rather than a neutral and objective mind-independent
 reality, their philosophical orientation leads them to commit egregious acts
 of imposition, which they cannot even recognize, identify, or understand as
 imposition. In short, Mr. Ramsay and Tansley are victims of philosophy, which
 leads them to victimize others.
 But Mr. Ramsay does have a moment when he finally overcomes philoso?
 phy, and significantly, it is at this moment that he experiences an intimacy,
 which is knowledge, similar to that of Lily and his wife. In the closing moments
 ofthe novel, when Mr. Ramsay, James, and Cam finally arrive at the lighthouse,
 Mr. Ramsay is pictured as if he were taking a leap of atheism: "He rose and
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 stood in the bow of the boat, very straight and tail, for all the world, James
 thought, as if he were saying, 'There is no God"' (207). This atheistic reference
 would be nearly impossible to understand were the reader unaware ofthe two
 types of knowledge that Woolf has been strategically outlining throughout the
 novel. Earlier in the novel, Mrs. Ramsay searches her heart and mind in order
 to purge herself of a knowledge system (theological in nature) that has taken
 possession of her from within. Mr. Ramsay, by contrast, focuses on Knowl?
 edge ofthe external world, "'subject and object and the nature of reality.'" Not
 surprisingly, when Mrs. and Mr. Ramsay are confronted with siruations in
 which a person is trapped, at the level ofthe semiotic unconscious, into belief,
 Mr. Ramsay, unlike Mrs. Ramsay, does not reflect on the consequences of
 such epistemic incarceration. He does not know how to unearth the semiotic
 unconscious as it functions and exists within his body, nor does he understand
 the consequences such knowledge would have on his conscious and rational
 formulations about the world. Such tenuous knowledge, being a mere second?
 ary quality, does not exist in the strict sense ofthe word for him, so he cannot
 see it at this point in the novel. As a consequence, he interacts with others as if
 his primary/secondary (reality/appearance) distinction is a metaphysical fact of
 being, and given his commitment to reality, he either cannot see or dismisses as
 irrelevant that which is secondary, like the ephemeral and contingent contents
 ofthe semiotic unconscious. As a result, he simply imposes his philosophically
 grounded system of Knowledge on others without considering that he has been
 trapped into believing what he philosophically believes. Cam describes her
 father's philosophical mentality with absolute precision: "But what remained
 intolerable, she thought,..., was that crass blindness and tyranny of his which
 had poisoned her childhood and raised bitter storms, so that even now she woke
 in the night trembling with rage and remembered some command of his: some
 insolence: 'Do this,' 'Do that,' his dominance; his 'Submit to me'" (169-70).
 Notice how Cam faults her father for blindness before mentioning his tyranny.
 For Woolf, philosophy's major flaw is embodied in the logical connection:
 blindness to the semiotic unconscious within self and others makes a person
 feel justified in arrogantly and tyrannically imposing on others.
 But by the end ofthe novel, when he is no longer pondering philosophical
 issues (significantly, the references to philosophy and the philosopher disap-
 pear by the end ofthe novel, as they do in Orlando), Mr. Ramsay finally takes
 the same journey as his wife, purging his inner life of the theological lie that
 holds him captive at the level ofthe semiotic unconscious. In other words, the
 atheistic reference suggests that he has, like his wife, finally seen and identi-
 fied the contents ofthe semiotic unconscious, which enables him, like his wife,
 to purge his inner life of the theological lie that once held him and his wife
 captive. Such an understanding of the semiotic unconscious may undermine
 his philosophical commitment to the immutable Truths of metaphysics, but
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 it does make him able to see and understand the inner lives of other people.
 For instance, now that he has put philosophical Knowledge behind him and
 embraced Lily's and his wife's tenuous "knowledge," he, not surprisingly, expe?
 riences a moment of intimacy with his children. NormaUy absorbed in his
 own world and therefore obtuse to the inner life of others, Mr. Ramsay never
 gives his son what he secretly needs and desires. What James wants most is his
 father's approval, something that Mr. Macalister gives James when he says that
 "'He s doing very well'" (204) in steering the boat to the lighthouse. Macalister s
 remark leads James to think: "But his father never praised him." And yet, as they
 near the lighthouse, Mr. Ramsay finally says to his son: "'Well done'" (206).
 This simple compliment indicates that Mr. Ramsay has been able, for the first
 time in the novel, to understand and appreciate James's inner life, which Cam
 understands quite clearly:
 There! Cam thought, addressing herself silently to James. YouVe got it at last. For
 she knew that this was what James had been wanting, and she knew that now
 he had got it he was so pleased that he would not look at her or at his father or
 at any one. (206)
 In word and deed, Mr. Ramsay has finally learned how to see, understand, and
 appreciate the unconscious desire of his son, that which exists in the "secret
 chambers" of James's interior life. But such "knowledge" has only become pos?
 sible now that he has put the metaphysical Knowledge of philosophy behind
 him. Indeed, To The Lighthouse and Orlando are difficult to understand without
 taking into account the disappearance of philosophy. But for Woolf, we should
 welcome the death of philosophy, for with its death, human intimacy and
 sensitivity become possible.
 "I don't want 'a philosophy' in the least."
 ?(Virginia Woolf,
 Diary 4:126)
 Given my interpretation, I want to suggest a new approach to Woolf and
 philosophy. When scholars discuss Woolfs treatment of philosophy, they have
 tended to frame the debate incorrectly. The interpretive strategy has been to
 defend Woolf from the charge of not being philosophical, as if being philo?
 sophical were a badge of honor legitimizing her intellectual work or as if her
 intellectual goal were to be philosophical. For example, in The Singing ofthe
 Real World, Hussey counters Leonard Woolfs assertion that Virginia "had
 'no philosophy of life'" by claiming that Virginia "Woolfs art... is implicitly
 philosophical" (xi). Similarly, Penelope Ingram challenges Erwin Steinberg's
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 "suggestion 'that Woolf expressed not only a lack of interest in any particular
 philosophy and, indeed, in philosophy as a study in general'" by arguing that
 "in To The Lighthouse Woolf formulates a philosophy" (82). In The Phantom
 Table, Banfield dismisses the idea "that Woolfs grasp ofthe whole import of
 Russell's philosophy was at best vague and at worst wrong" by claiming that
 Woolfs "work and her aesthetic seize the real possibilities of Russell's thought
 for art" (xiii), which leads Banfield to refer to Woolfs work as a "philosophically
 inflected aesthetic" (54). In each one of these cases, the scholars take philosophy
 as a marker signifying profound intellectual depth, and since they all consider
 Woolf a serious thinker, they conclude that she must therefore be philosophical.
 In my analysis, however, I follow Woolf, who says in her diary: "I don't want 'a
 philosophy'in the least."
 My work, which is in the same tradition as Melba Cuddy-Keane's, not
 only draws a very different conclusion from scholars like Hussey, Ingram,
 and Banfield about Woolfs treatment of and attitude towards philosophy,
 but also frames the discussion in an entirely different manner. In her bril-
 liant study, Virginia Woolf, the Intellectual, and the Public Sphere, Cuddy-Keane
 convincingly argues that Woolfs understanding of the unconscious radically
 inflected her experience of reading, knowledge, aesthetics, and life. According
 to Cuddy-Keane, the "dominating political self-consciousness" of Woolfs
 time "excluded the unconscious?and its fertilizing richness" (103). Instead
 of clearly demarcating the unconscious and the conscious, rather than sub-
 jecting the unconscious to the piercing scrutiny of the conscious intellect,
 Cuddy-Keane insightfully claims that "unconscious assimilation," for Woolf,
 "is not prior to conscious apprehension; it is an ever-present, formative partici-
 pant enabling the apparent seamlessness of conscious thought" (125). There?
 fore, Cuddy-Keane concludes that the unconscious "is an active and creative
 participant in thought" (125).
 Cuddy-Keane does not specifically examine how Woolf s understanding or
 experience ofthe unconscious relates to or undermines philosophy, but she does
 argue, as I do, that the "radical work of the unconscious supplants normalized
 rationality" (129). While I am certainly sympathetic to Cuddy-Keane's overall
 project and convinced by her patient and thorough analyses of Woolf's texts, I
 do want to use my work on modernist anti-philosophicalism to qualify her view
 of the Woolfian unconscious. Many modernists, including Woolf, recognized
 that in the western intellectual tradition, for knowledge to be Knowledge, it
 must be conscious and rational, and since philosophy has claimed privileged
 access to that which is conscious and rational, it therefore claims to stand on
 the highest rung on the intellectual chain of being. But if Cuddy-Keane is right,
 that "the solidity of the rational logical world of language is disrupted as we
 descend into the unconscious" (128), then the philosophers rational and logical
 claims would be profoundly untrustworthy. And yet, for Woolf, the problem
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 is not just the unreliability of philosophy's "truths"; the problem is that the
 valorization of philosophy's rational and conscious precepts as objective, time-
 less, and/or universal ultimately renders the semiotic unconscious ephemeral,
 contingent, and therefore irrelevant. According to Woolf, therefore, those who
 have internalized the philosopher's orientation toward knowledge will not only
 dismiss manifestations of the unconscious as insignificant and, in a certain
 sense, non-existent; they will fail to see such manifestations altogether.
 For Woolf, this blindness to the reality of the unconscious can and does
 have devastating consequences on the capacity of humans to interact with oth?
 ers in a productive, meaningful, and life-invigorating manner. At this point, I
 want to set my work on the unconscious off from Cuddy-Keane's. For Cuddy-
 Keane, the Woolfian unconscious is treated as a positive, near-benevolent force.
 Described in terms of "its fertilizing richness" (103), it is "the writers source
 of inspiration" (131). In other words, the "unconscious ... is envisioned as an
 active, creative mode" (124). While I do not disagree with this interpretation,
 I would add that Woolf also treats the unconscious as a potentially tyranni-
 cal force, something that could debilitate and destroy relationships. We see
 this first through the philosophers' failure to acknowledge or understand the
 semiotic unconscious, which leads them to lack epistemological humility, the
 self-reflexive ability to question the unconscious frame of reference that pre-
 determines their conscious framing ofthe world. Failure to see or to take into
 account the semiotic unconscious can lead people to adopt a mentality that
 they do not even believe that they believe, as did Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay with
 regard to theological discourse. Therefore, for those who fail to identify the
 unconscious discourse that has taken possession of them from within, there
 is the real danger that they will impose on others a discourse that they do not
 believe. So the philosophers' blindness to the unconscious debilitates in two
 ways: it makes them epistemologically arrogant, such that they do not and even
 cannot question the legitimacy of their rational and logical conceptual frame;
 and it therefore makes them vulnerable to projecting a discourse on others that
 they do not even believe that they believe. Only by acknowledging the existence
 ofthe semiotic unconscious and by subjecting it to intense scrutiny, purging out
 of existence any lie that has taken possession of them from within, is it possible
 to neutralize its potentially tyrannical effect over them.
 This critique ofthe philosophical mindset is crucial in Woolfs project to
 create the epistemological conditions for experiencing human intimacy. If the
 semiotic unconscious, as "creative mode" and/or tyrannical power, is the basis
 and foundation of our uniquely human being, our being as humans, then igno-
 rance of it would make us incapable of knowing and/or connecting with other
 humans. Therefore, to experience "intimacy itself, which is knowledge," one
 must acknowledge the existence of the ever-mutable and always-contingent
 semiotic unconscious. Having done that, one could develop the "art"of pressing
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 through into the "secret chambers"of a persons complex interior. Acknowledg-
 ing the existence and primacy ofthe semiotic unconscious may be, according
 to Woolf, devastating for philosophers, since the semiotic unconscious implic-
 itly casts doubt on philosophy's metaphysical mind and absolute Truth, but
 acknowledging its existence and power also has the virtue of enabling people
 to understand and appreciate the inner lives of others, something that makes
 human intimacy possible. For Woolf, we only have much to gain by embracing
 the semiotic unconscious and abandoning philosophy.
 Significantly, this engagement with and revaluation of philosophy was a
 major concern for much of her career. While it is clear, as Ingram and Tom
 Regan argue, that the philosopher G.E. Moore heavily influenced Bloomsbury
 in general, and Woolf in particular, it is also clear that Woolf started to wonder
 as early as 1920 why someone like Moore exerted so much influence on her
 intellectual circle:13 "I don't see altogether why he [Moore] was the domina-
 tor &c dictator of youth" (Diary 2:49). Indeed, Woolf cleverly invokes Plato's
 image ofthe cave ("Perhaps Cambridge is too much ofa cave") to explain why
 so many in her circle were intellectually seduced?trapped in Cambridge s
 Plato-like cave, Bloomsbury writers were too easily enticed by the siren song
 of Moore's philosophy. My claim is not so much that Ingram and Regan are
 wrong, as it is that Woolf, while influenced by philosophy early in her career
 (1904-1919), had a radical change of heart around the year 1920, which led to
 her direct and focused assault on philosophy in the mid to late 1920s.
 What accounted for that change of heart was her attempt to understand
 her father, who had a philosophical mind but who had virtually no ability,
 according to Woolf, to understand individual human beings. As Woolf says
 of her father in her autobiography, he was "conscious of his failure as a phi?
 losopher" ("Sketch" 145), a characterization that certainly brings Mr. Ramsay
 to mind. In fact, Stephen bears a striking resemblance to Mr. Ramsay in "his
 severe love of truth" (134), his "tyrannical" (106) behavior, and his incessant
 "egotism" (147). But what is most relevant for the argument of this essay is
 Stephen's inability to understand human character. As she says of her father:
 The reason for that complete unconsciousness of his own behaviour is to be found
 in the disparity, so obvious in his books, between the critical and the imagina?
 tive power. Give him a thought to analyse, the thought say of Mill or Bentham
 or Hobbes, and he is (so Maynard told me) a model of acuteness, clarity, and
 impartiality. Give him a character to explain, and he is (to me) so crude, so
 elementary, so conventional that a child with a box of chalks could make a more
 subtle portrait. (146)
 What accounts for his conventional simplicity, as I have been trying to argue
 throughout this essay, is his refusal or inability to understand and/or appreciate
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 the subtle "reality" and workings of the semiotic unconscious, that tenuous
 world that philosophers, according to Freud, refuse to acknowledge. Of course,
 one could argue that it is the failure, and not philosophy ("conscious of his
 failure as a philosopher"), that makes both Mr. Ramsay and Stephen such
 unbearable figures, but the combined assault on philosophy found in Orlando
 and To The Lighthouse coupled with Woolfs rejection of philosophy and its dis?
 tinctive approach to knowledge suggest that Woolf faulted philosophy. So when
 Woolf was working most intensely through her relationship with her father,
 that is, when she was writing To The Lighthouse,14 she was looking for some sort
 of overarching explanation to make sense of characters like Mr. Ramsay and
 Tansley, and it was in her father's philosophical orientation toward knowledge
 that she found an answer.
 Based on my findings in this essay, therefore, I want to suggest an alterna?
 tive frame for understanding Woolfs treatment of philosophy and, more gen-
 erally, modernist anti-philosophicalism. Instead of assuming that philosophy
 signifies intellectual depth, as Hussey, Ingram, and Banfield do, I would suggest
 approaching Woolf, as well as many modernists, in terms of their scathing
 critique of philosophy. Something intrinsic to the philosophical mindset episte-
 mologically disables and debilitates people, such that philosophically-inclined
 individuals tend to be arrogant and autocratic and consequently cannot enter
 into healthy or productive relationships with others. What causes philosophy
 and philosophers to be so narrow, limited, and ultimately destructive? The
 answer to this question differs considerably from one modernist to the next.
 What we need are more studies that use a new frame to discuss the literary
 modernist assault on philosophy. But if my findings in this essay are convinc-
 ing, what we can say about Woolf and philosophy is this: to have an intimate
 understanding of Woolf and her work, we must first banish philosophy and
 the philosopher.
 Notes
 1. I would like to thank Pamela Caughie, Mark Hussey, and the JML's editorial reader for helping me
 better focus the argument ofthis essay and for their insightful feedback on my work.
 2. Aristotle makes this point directly in the Poetics'. "poetry is something more philosophic and of
 graver import than history, since its statements are ofthe nature rather of universals, whereas those of
 history are singulars." Poetry is superior to history only insofar as it approximates the highest forms of
 knowledge, which are "philosophic*' (1464) in nature.
 3. For excellent discussions ofthe Cambridge Apostles' extensive influence on Bloomsbury writers,
 see S.P. Rosenbaum's Victorian Bloomsbury: The Early Literary History ofthe Bloomsbury Group Volume
 1 (161-238) and Ann Banfield's The Phantom Table (1-55).
 4. For an excellent discussion of Wittgenstein's post-Tractatus silence, see Ray Monk's Ludwig
 Wittgenstein: The Duty ofGenius (169-253).
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 5. For an excellent discussion of the early-twentieth century conflict between psychology and phi?
 losophy, specifically the way psychology posed a threat to the basic premises of philosophy, see Martin
 Jay's essay, "Modernism and the Specter of Psychologism."
 6. For an insightful discussion ofthe way psychology began to emancipate itself from philosophy in the
 late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see Judith Ryan's The Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology
 and Literary Modernism.
 7. In a recent discussion about Woolfs rejection of philosophy, Mark Hussey asked me how I can
 justify my claim when Woolf refers to what she "might call a philosophy" in A Sketch ofthe Past. My reply
 was/is this: Woolf was an atheist, but in her Diaries, she frequently uses phrases like "God knows." When
 I mention Woolf's rejection of philosophy, I mean that she rejected the formal discipline of philosophy
 in the same way that she formally renounced belief in God. But rejecting God and philosophy does not
 mean that she can't use the concepts in a looser, more general sense. I want to specifically thank Mark
 and Pamela Caughie for helping me work though this distinction.
 8. For a discussion ofthis short story and how it is a trial run for the creation of Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay,
 see my essay, "Ihe Gender of Atheism in Virginia Woolfs A Simple Melody.'"
 9. For a more in-depth analysis ofthis idea of being physiologically false, see my essay, "Killing God,
 Liberating the 'Subject': Nietzsche and Post-God Freedom." For a discussion ofthis idea specifically
 within the context of Woolfs works, see my essay, "Atheism and Sadism: Nietzsche and Woolf on
 Post-God Discourse."
 10. For a more in-depth analysis of Woolfs treatment ofthe semiotic unconscious of religious dis?
 courses, see my essay, "Virginia Woolf and T.S. Eliot: An Atheist s Commentary on the Epistemology
 of Belief."
 11. Levinas refers to the tyrannical impulse of philosophy as a form of "ontological imperialism" (44).
 12. Nietzsche traces the breakdown ofthe distinction between the real and apparent worlds in Twilight
 ofthe Idols: "We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? ... But
 no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent worldf (51).
 13. In Bloomsbury s Prophet, Tom Regan rightly argues that Moore s Principia Ethica was considered a
 sacred book for Bloomsbury writers. While I agree with Regan's claim, I would only add that Woolf
 changed her view considerably during the 1920s. My objective in this essay is to explain why.
 14. In "A Sketch ofthe Past," Woolf clearly indicates that To TheLighthousewas her attempt to come
 to terms with her rage against her father (108).
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 Woolf was one of many modemists who led an assault on philosophy. Given her
 anti-philosophical orientation, those scholars who use philosophy to interpret Woolf
 I argue, are implicitly at odds with her aesthetic. Crucial to my argument is Woolfs
 conception ofwhat Irefer to as the semiotic unconscious, which predetermines the
 conceptual systems we use to systematize our experiences ofthe world. Based on my
 findings, I suggest an alternative frame for understanding Woolfs treatment of phi?
 losophy and, more generally, modernist anti-philosophicalism. Instead ofassuming
 thatphilosophy signifies intellectual depth, as many scholars do, Isuggest approaching
 Woolf as well as many modemists, in terms of their scathing critique of philosophy.
 What we need are more studies that use a new frame to discuss the literary modernist
 assault on philosophy. Asfor Woolf I conclude: to have an intimate understanding of
 her work, we must first banish philosophy and the philosopher.
 Keywords: Virginia Woolf/ philosophy / unconscious / intimacy / knowledge
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